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Abstract—With the advent of Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs) and exploits such as Eurograbber, we can no longer
trust the users PC or mobile phone to be honest in their
transactions with banks. This paper reviews the current state
of the art in protecting PCs from malware and APTs that can
modify banking transactions, and identifies their strengths and
weaknesses. It then proposes an enhanced USB device based on
speech and vision. User trials with a software prototype show
that such a device is both user friendly and that users are less
susceptible to accepting subtly modified transaction with this
device than with other vision only USB devices. Since human
factors are usually the weakest point in the security chain, and
are often the way that APT actors perform their attacks, the
focus of the proposed solution is on improving the usability of
existing USB devices. However the device is still not failsafe,
and therefore may not be as preferable as Sm@rt TAN-plus
that is currently used by many German banks.
Keywords-Advanced Persistent Threats, Banking Transac-
tions; Transaction Authentication Number; usability;
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary motivation for non-political cyber attacks is
to gain money. In March/April 2016 cyber crime was the
source of more than 70% of cyber attacks [21]. Furthermore,
the goals for these targeted attacks are not only to steal
credit card and bank information, but also to alter online
transactions [19]. In 2009, more than half a million dollars
was stolen from Patco Constructions online bank account,
because there was no transaction verification of the online
transactions. The company successfully sued the bank for
having commercially unreasonable security procedures [1].
Banks are therefore responsible for providing transaction
protection mechanisms. In 2012 the Eurograbber exploit
stole more than 36 million Euros from 30,000 customers of
multiple European banks [13], even though these banks were
using an Out-Of-Band (OOB) transaction authentication
method. They were sending the transaction details and a
Transaction Authentication Number (TAN) via SMS to the
customer’s mobile device so that the customer could confirm
her online transaction by entering the TAN into her PCs
online banking session. Unbeknown to the customer, the
Zeus Trojan [9] had previously infected her PCs browser
and had asked her for details of her mobile device under
the pretense of installing new security software on it. This
allowed the attackers to install malware instead on the
mobile, so that when Zeus injected false transactions into
the web banking session, the malware could intercept the
TAN in the mobile, and relay it back to Zeus to confirm the
transaction.
Consequently the customer was not aware that fraudulent
transactions were taking place in the background. What
these examples show is that we can no longer trust any
of the banking transactions that a bank receives from a
PCs banking application to be genuine, nor can we trust
mobile devices that allow executables to be downloaded
onto them. The sophistication of todays malware means
that attackers can effectively take control of the PC and
either modify transactions or inject new transactions almost
at will. We cannot be sure which components, such as the
operating system, firmware, or application software, have
been infected. Furthermore, Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs), in which the malware is controlled by a remote
human controller, is sent encrypted, and can be modified
and dynamically tailored to suit the victims PC, means
that antivirus software will always be behind the curve in
detecting their presence and effectively removing them. We
must therefore look for an alternative means of protecting
online banking transactions sent from untrustworthy devices.
We consider Eurograbber to be an APT because Euro-
grabber 1) is a targeted attack, which targets only banking
users 2) controllers aim to keep a foothold on the victims
machines 3) is a sophisticated attack, not only does it infect
victims PCs but also their mobile devices 4) controllers
utilized phishing attacks to initially infect victims machines.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
reviews the current state of the art and identifies the strengths
and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms. Section III
discusses the requirements for an ideal solution and de-
scribes our proposed mechanism. Section IV describes the
software implementation of a prototype of the new proposed
mechanism. Section V describes the user trials with the
software prototype, whilst section VI concludes the article.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Oppliger et al. [20] identify three different types of attack
against banking applications, which they term: credential
stealing, channel breaking and content manipulation. The
latter two are also known by their more populist terms as:
Man in the Middle (MitM) and Man in the Browser (MitB)
attacks. The Zeus Trojan used in the Eurograbber is a MitB
attack, since it injects malicious code into the browser that
is activated when the user starts an online banking session.
Shujun Li et al. [17] also identify a fourth category that they
term Man in the Computer (MitC), which is best exemplified
by an APT that takes full control of a users PC. This is
more pernicious, since it can control all the input and output
channels including the keyboard, screen, network, filestore
etc., meaning that nothing in the PC can be trusted.
Mitigating solutions have typically comprised either
multi-factor user authentication or transaction authentication.
The former is designed to combat credential stealing, so that
even if the users password is stolen, the attacker still does
not have access to the other authentication factor(s). Many
different form factors have been employed including mobile
phones, time based or challenge/response based OTP fobs,
smart cards, and paper based grids. Some banks are still us-
ing a second set of security questions and so are doubling up
on something you know. Nevertheless, however good multi-
factor user authentication schemes are, they don not address
the real problem, which is to stop fraudulent transactions.
Transaction authentication schemes on the other hand are
designed to do this by having a second trusted device for the
user to either enter or confirm the veracity of a transaction.
The other device, which also acts as a second factor in
user authentication (something you have), could be a home
telephone, mobile phone or bespoke equipment provided by
the bank. A number of different schemes have been deployed
by banks or proposed in the literature and these are critically
reviewed below. They either rely on secure hardware for
sending the transaction, or an OOB channel for confirming
it.
One of the first OOB schemes that the banks implemented
was to look for unusual or suspicious transactions submitted
to a customers account, and then to telephone the customer
(usually at home) asking them to confirm that it was genuine.
Unfortunately this has been successfully attacked in a couple
of ways, both of which involve the fraudsters hosting a call
reception center to take the banks calls. In the first variant,
the fraudster phones the customer at home, pretending to be
from the telephone company, and gets the customer to reveal
their sensitive account information. The fraudsters then use
this to masquerade as the customer and to ask the telephone
company to transfer incoming calls to their call center
whilst the fraudulent transactions are being carried out. They
then transfer calls back again once the transactions have
been verified. A more recent variant of this has modified
the Zeus Trojan to automatically collect telephone account
information from customers when they are on their PCs [16].
Consequently we find this scheme to be vulnerable to attack.
Another popular OOB scheme used by many banks, is
m-TAN, in which the bank sends an SMS to the users
mobile phone. This contains details of the transaction and
a TAN which the user must return to the bank via his PC
banking session. As previously noted, this has been success-
fully exploited in Eurograbber [13]. But more worryingly,
AlZomai et al. [7] found that even if the mobile device was
not infected, obviously modified transactions, in which the
transaction account details in the SMS differed significantly
to those entered into the PC, were not spotted in 21% of
cases in their user trials, whilst subtly modified transactions,
in which just one digit of an account number was modified,
were not spotted in 61% of cases. Consequently we find
this scheme to be both vulnerable to attack, and lacking in
usability.
Due to the inherent weaknesses in m-TAN, many German
banks are now moving towards the Sm@rt TAN-plus system
(e.g. [2], [3]). This is a handheld device with a keypad, a
display and a smart card reader. The user inserts their ATM
chip and PIN card into the device, reenters (some subset of)
the transaction details (that they have previously entered into
their web banking session) and their smart card computes
the TAN which the user must then copy back to the web
session. If the transaction received by the bank does not
match the TAN, then the bank knows that it is different
from the one input to the Sm@rt TAN-plus device, and can
abort it. The advantage of this system is the low cost of
the device to the bank as the cryptography computations
are done by the existing smart card. The disadvantage is in
terms of its usability, since users must enter (some subset of)
the transaction details twice, and then copy the TAN back
to their PC. An optical variant of this, Sm@rt-TAN optic,
addresses the first usability issue, as it reads the transaction
details directly from rapidly flickering images on the PC
screen, using 5 optical sensors in the back of the device.
However this is not recommended for epilepsy suffers as
the flickering images could cause seizures.
An earlier transaction verification scheme designed specif-
ically with security in mind, is the 10 year old FINREAD
CEN standard [19], [11]. FINREAD devices are connected
to the PC and have an inbuilt keypad, smart card reader
and display. They will only execute digitally signed Finlets
downloaded from the PC. However, few banks, if any, have
adopted this PKI based system, as the end user devices cost
over e200 each [4]Consequently we find this scheme to be
prohibitively expensive.
Matthew Johnson designed a USB device for authenticat-
ing transactions, which he called the dongle [12]. For usabil-
ity, the dongle simply consists of a display and two buttons,
one to accept the transaction, the other to reject it. Like
most previous mechanisms, the dongle works in synchronous
mode, meaning that the user submits his transaction via
his PC, then confirms or denies it when it is displayed on
the device, before he can submit another transaction. Cost
was taken into account by using symmetric cryptography
(AES recommended) instead of PKI, with long term secret
keys shared between the dongle and the bank. Session keys
are dynamically generated for encrypting the transactions.
MACs are used for message integrity. A software prototype
was built to simulate the dongles functionality, but no user
trials were carried out. Adham et al. proposed an almost
identical system in [5], but with fewer worked out details.
This scheme suffers from the same usability problems as
m-TAN.
hPIN/hTAN [17] is similarly designed with cost and
usability in mind, but this is a mechanism for securely
sending a transaction to the bank, rather than an OOB
confirmation of it. This USB device only uses HMAC as
the core cryptographic method and requires neither a second
trusted channel nor a secure keypad nor a trusted third
party nor encryption, so it is very cheap to manufacture,
the estimated cost of this USB device e(3-5). The device
comprises a display and a single OK button. hPIN is used
to authenticate the user and hTAN to authenticate each
transaction. After inserting the device into the PC, the user
presses OK, enters her userID into the PC which is relayed
to the device, whereupon the device displays the digits 0 to 9
and beneath each digit a randomly generated code (letter or
digit) that the user must substitute when entering her PIN
into the PC. The code characters are relayed back to the
device allowing it to authenticate the user.
To verify a transaction, the sensitive information is entered
to the PC but displayed on the device, whilst the PC simply
shows asterisks. This is to ensure that the user cannot
misread the transaction information (as is the case with m-
TAN). After each item of sensitive information is entered,
such as account number or amount, the user must press
OK on the device, wait a few seconds, then press OK
again. The device then sends the transaction information
to the banking server along with a HMAC hash. In user
trials with 20 students, 91% managed to successfully login,
and the mean usability score was 3.65 on a 5 point Likert
scale. Consequently this scheme is still not ubiquitously user
friendly.
IBMs Zone Trusted Information Channel (ZTIC) [23] is
another USB device for securely sending transactions to the
bank. It comprises a display, two buttons and optionally a
smart card reader for authenticating the user. ZTIC acts as a
secure pass through proxy between the PCs web browser and
the bank and sets up a TLS connection between itself and the
banking server. It intercepts all banking transactions between
the web browser and itself and displays the vital information
to the user, allowing her to press either the confirm or abort
buttons. In this way the user can see the exact details of each
transaction before it is relayed to the bank. Only a careless
user would allow modified transactions to pass, but as the
research in [7] shows, this is more common than one would
hope for, and therefore it is still as lacking in usability as
m-TAN.
III. ANALYSIS AND DESIGN
Analysis of the above mechanisms shows that transaction
authentication, as opposed to only multi factor user authen-
tication, is essential. To be secure against MitM, MitB and
MitC requires a separate hardware device that is immune to
being infected with viruses or APTs, otherwise it will be
susceptible to attacks such as Eurograbber. This effectively
means that the device should not be capable of accepting
software downloads, which rules out mobile phones. One
might concede that, from a security point of view, accepting
only digitally signed downloads, for example as per the
FINREAD specification is also acceptable. But this adds
considerable complexity to the device, making it no longer a
cost effective solution. At over e200 per FINREAD device,
the banks have already decided it is more cost effective to
use an alternative cheaper device that cannot accept software
downloads, for example, the Sm@rt TAN-plus device that
retails for e15 [3].
Even this device might be considered expensive compared
to known transactions losses. Although Eurograbber stole
e36 million, the population of the Eurozone countries was
332 million in 2011. If only 10% of these perform online
banking, which is a conservative estimate1, this still only
represents a loss of e1 per online banking customer. Con-
sequently, any mechanism we propose should not retail for
more than Sm@rt TAN-plus, should be at least as secure as
Sm@rt TAN-plus and better than it on usability grounds, if it
is to have any chance of being accepted in the market place.
(We use Sm@rt TAN-plus as the benchmark here since it is
already used by many banks).
Several state of the art designs are based on USB de-
vices [17], [12], [23]. These have the advantages over Sm@rt
TAN-plus of not needing replacement batteries, and are
much more compact to carry around. Depending upon the
design, they may be easier or more difficult to use than
Sm@rt TAN-plus. Whilst hPIN/hTAN wins on cost, at e3-5
for the components [23], in our opinion it fails on usability as
1 in 10 users failed to login and the mean usability score was
not high at only 3.65/5.0. Whilst ZTIC is better than Sm@rt
TAN-plus for usability (users only have to visually compare
transaction details and press the confirm button once vs.
enter (part of) the transaction again, compare it visually and
enter a TAN to the PC), it fails on cost. Swiss bank UBS are
retailing ZTIC to their customers at e50 [15]. Admittedly
this does contain a smart card reader to authenticate the
user, but then so does Sm@rt TAN-plus. The remaining
USB contender is Matthew Johnsons dongle, which we asses
to be more usable than Sm@rt TAN-plus (since it has the
same usability as ZTIC) and it should be able to retail for
1Over a third of Internet users accessed online banking sites
in Europe in 2012 (http://www.comscoredatamine.com/2012/06/1-
in-4-internet-users-access-banking-sites-globally/) whilst over two
thirds of Europeans use the Internet (http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2013.pdf)
about the same price as Sm@rt TAN-plus. Whilst Johnson
does not actually build his dongle, he reasons that USB
Internet phones are comparable in complexity to the dongle
and these typically retail from e13-39. The main difference
between the USB devices and Sm@rt TAN-plus, is that if
the user makes a mistake when accepting the transaction,
Sm@rt TAN-plus will abort the transaction, whereas the
USB devices will accept it. This is because if the user inputs
wrong information to the Sm@rt TAN-plus device, the TAN
will not match the received transaction causing the bank
to abort it; whilst if a user makes a mistake matching the
transaction displayed on the USB device with the one he
intends to submit, and presses the accept button, then the
transaction displayed on the device will be accepted by the
bank. Sm@rt TAN-plus is therefore failsafe, whilst the USB
devices are not. Our design builds on Matthew Johnsons
dongle with the objective of reducing the incidence of
users who mistakenly accept modified transactions, thereby
endeavoring to make the device more failsafe.
We know from [7] that users failed to spot 21% of sig-
nificantly modified transactions and 61% of subtly modified
ones. This user error could be for several reasons. Firstly
people see what they expect to see [24], meaning that if
they expect a transaction to show xyz they will tend to
see xyz even if it did not show exactly that. Secondly
many users lack security awareness. We also know from
a survey conducted by B2B International and Kaspersky
Lab [14],that more than half of the 8,605 respondents
from different regions use no security on their Android
phones. Furthermore, in a recent large scale study of users
clicking through security warnings in browsers, a tenth
clicked through Mozilla Firefoxs malware and phishing
warnings, a quarter through Google Chromes malware and
phishing warnings, and a third through Mozilla Firefoxs SSL
warnings [6]. We therefore need a mechanism where security
is built in and cannot be switched off, and can jolt people
sufficiently so that they do not see what they expect to see,
but rather what is there. They need to be made more aware
when a transaction is not what they were expecting it to be,
so that they do not click through it.
It is well known that we learn best if we stimulate
several senses at once [18]. We can significantly increase a
users awareness by using multiple modes of communication.
Speech is a fundamental means of human communication.
Cognitive research and tests show that verbal communica-
tion can sometimes be the greatest means for transferring
information, and the end-user does not need to pay as
strict attention in contrast to vision communication [22].
[22], [10] describe situations where using audio is better
than using a display, such as when the message is simple,
short, will not be referred to later, or calls for immediate
action. All of these situations apply to the proposed device.
The audio message is simple and short since it contains
only the beneficiary IBAN and the amount of money to
be transferred, and the user should take immediate action
after hearing the audio message. By combining voice with
a digital display in the USB device, this should be able to
better communicate to a user that a transaction is or is not
the same as they expected. Since a programmable voice chip
costs approximately 50 US cents to buy in bulk then it will
not add significantly to the overall cost of the USB device.
The modified design of the USB device is to have three
buttons instead of two, with the extra button being to replay
the speech of the transaction in case the user mishears it
first time. When the user connects the USB device to the
PC, it autonomously establishes a secure connection with
the banking server (independently of the web browser) and
polls the server to see if there are any pending transactions.
If there are it downloads the first one, displays the details
(account number and amount) and simultaneously speaks it
out. If the user is happy with the details he presses the accept
button, otherwise the decline button. If another transaction
is pending, this will then be downloaded. Our design allows
the user to submit as many transactions as he wishes to the
banking site, independently of the USB device. However,
each transaction is placed in the pending state until the user
either confirms or aborts the transaction via the USB device.
This is an improvement over all previous schemes that have
been synchronous in nature. Our design allows the user to
submit transactions even if he does not have his USB device
with him. He can subsequently confirm them when he does
have his device.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION
Similar to Matthew Johnson, we only had the resources to
implement a software prototype device. But since the main
objective of the research is to determine the users increased
ability in spotting subtly modified transactions, we decided
that comparing Johnsons software prototype with ours would
be sufficient to do this. We built a dummy banking web site
that has a login page followed by two main pages: submit
transaction and transaction status. The former contains fields
that allow the user to enter a new transaction, whilst the latter
contains the list of recent transactions, each marked as either
Confirmed, Cancelled or Pending. At the bottom of the page
is a Connect USB device button which brings up one of the
USB devices in a pop up window (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).
All the web pages were created using Java Server Pages
(JSP). The DB comprises three tables: account, transaction
and users. There is a many-to-one relation between the
account table and users table, which allows a user to possess
several bank accounts.
Two software prototype devices were built as separate
pages on the banking web site, one based on Johnsons
design and one on our enhanced design (see Figures 1
and 2 respectively). The chosen device displays a pending
transaction in a pop up window in the main browser window,
to simulate viewing it on a USB device. The devices were
built in the Java language consisting of three parts: the
speaking part (optional), the GUI part, and existing Java
functions and methods for sending and receiving message
and establishing a secure connection. The FreeTTS project 2
was used to accomplish the speech function. However
FreeTTS v1.2 does not speak some thousand numbers in the
correct way, for example, the string 1500 is spoken as fifteen
hundreds instead of one thousand five hundred. We found
that by inserting a comma separator between the thousand
and hundred digits, it then spoke the number correctly.
Figure 1: Software prototype for Speech and Vision USB
device
Figure 2: Software prototype for Vision only USB device
When the user has submitted his transactions he can
view the transaction status and click the Connect USB
device button which will POST the users account number
to the device page. This page can then fetch the outstanding
pending transactions one by one and display them to the
user.
V. THE USER TRIALS
A. First experiment
10 students were recruited to test the two devices. All
were male Masters level students (since the research was
performed during the summer vacation, no undergraduate
students were available for recruitment). The experiment
consisted of two parts. In each part participants submitted
five transactions that were given to them on a printed piece
of paper. At any time during the part experiment they
could check and confirm that the submitted transactions
were correctly received by the bank. In the first part they
used the vision device, and in the second part the speech
and vision device. The participants had the freedom to
check and confirm the transactions whenever they wanted
to. After completing both parts the participants answered a
brief questionnaire.
The objective of the experiment that was disclosed to the
participants was that they were to test and comment upon
2http://freetts.sourceforge.net
the usability of two alternative USB device designs. In fact,
the main objective was to find out which of the devices
can best help the participant to detect a subtly modified
transaction, because one transaction in each part experiment
was intentionally modified by the banking server altering
just one digit of one account number.
The questionnaire comprised 6 questions. The first ques-
tion asked How easy was the vision device to use, with the
answer being selected from a 5 point Likert scale ranging
from very difficult to very easy. The second question asked
for any free form comments about the usability of the vision
device. Questions 3 and 4 repeated these for the speech
and vision device. Question 5 asked which device the user
preferred, whilst question 6 asked why they preferred this
device.
70% of participants failed to spot the subtly modified
account number with the vision token. This is comparable
with the 61% of failures recorded in [7], which had a
much larger sample of users (92 participants compared to
our 10). Disappointingly, 40% of participants still failed to
spot the subtly modified account number with the speech
and vision token. Obviously this represents the worst case
attack scenario, as an attacker would have to be very lucky
or devious to obtain a mule account with just one digit
different to the intended account number. However the
results do show that adding speech to the USB device has
a positive beneficial effect on users being able to detect
a subtly modified transaction, but this effect is not large
enough to be 100% failsafe. Clearly further experiments and
improvements are needed.
80% of participants said they preferred the speech
and vision token. The reasons given were because the
Speech/Vision token helps them to be more alert to the
transaction details, and its easier and more accurate to verify
the transactions. The two users who preferred the vision
device said that this was better because it was faster than
the voice and vision device, and one of them spotted the
subtly modified transaction using it (so had no need for the
voice confirmation). In terms of usability, both devices were
liked by the users, but the voice and vision device scored
slightly higher (all users gave it a 4 or 5).
B. Second experiment
We designed the second experiment to attract a large
number of users. Consequently it was performed through
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), a system that allows users
of the Internet to enroll for AMT experiments and be paid
small sums of money for successfully completing them.
In our experiment, each participant only tested one of the
devices and this was assigned to them dynamically when
they enrolled. (Even enrollment numbers were assigned one
device and odd enrollment num-bers the other device). As
before, the participants were allowed to enter the 5 trans-
actions displayed to them, in any order. The banking server
Table I: Summary of submissions
was configured to replace the first occurrence of the number
1 with the number 7 (or replace 2 with 3 if there was no
occurrence of 1), in just one account number of the five. This
was done for the first hundred participants of each device.
Then the server randomly changed 2 account digits of one
transaction for the next 100 users etc. until the account
number of one transaction was completely changed (or until
a lower number of changes were spotted by everyone). In
this way we should have been able to measure at what point
all users noticed that an account number had been changed,
for both a vision device and a speech and vision device. This
should indicate at what point the devices become failsafe (if
at all).
We received 2249 submissions, but after checking the
data, only 413 (18%) were deemed to be valid. Many partic-
ipants did not complete the experiment as requested in the
instructions. They either did not submit all 5 transactions, or
submitted one or more incorrect transactions (either a wrong
account number or monetary value). Many other participants
denied all 5 transactions, These speedies presumably could
not be bothered to verify the transactions and were only
interested in finishing the experiment as quickly as possible
in order to be paid. These submissions were reject-ed, and
some of these participants complained to us afterwards when
they had not been paid. The remaining 413 submissions
input 5 correct transactions and either accepted them all,
or denied, at most, one of them . It is highly likely that
a number of these participants accepted all 5 transactions
without checking them first, but it is not possible for us
to differentiate between these speedies and a conscientious
participant who missed spotting one or more incorrect digits.
The results indicate there were a significant number of these
speedies, due to the low spotting rate.
Table I shows the distribution of the submissions. The
total number of valid sub-missions using the speech and
vision device was 221, whilst using the vision only device
was 192. The valid submissions were divided into 9 groups
based on the number of modified digits in the corrupted
transaction. Figure 3 shows the percentage of participants
who discovered the transaction manipulation in each group.
The percentage of participants who spotted the manipulation
using the speech and vision device was higher for all groups
except the first one. The manipulation discovery across all
groups was 12% for the vision only device and 33% for the
speech and vision device.
Figure 3: Spotting out the modifications in each group
We additionally conducted a hypothesis analysis to val-
idate our assumption that the speech and vision device
improves the users ability to spot a modified transaction.
This statistical analysis approach aims to prove or disapprove
a hypothesis [8]. This can be accomplished by computing
the P-value, which represents the lowest level of significance
at which the observed value of a test statistic is significant.
This value is compared to the identified significance level,
which reflects the probability that observed results occurred
due to chance or error. Finally, null hypothesis is rejected if
the P-value is lower than the significance level.
Hence, in our analysis the null hypothesis is modification
discovery using the speech and vision device is the same as
modification discovery using the vision only device. After
performing the computation, the P-value was 0.0153, where
the significance level was 0.05 (i.e. 5%). Hence, we can
disapprove the null hypothesis. In other words, this proves
the speech and vision device improves the users ability to
spot a manipulations in transaction details.
VI. CONCLUSION
Human factors are often the entry point for malicious
attacks, and are considered the weakest point in the security
chain. Moreover, according to our analysis of APT attacks
(including the Eurograbber incident), APT actors usually
infect victims’ devices, and keep a foothold there, by exploit-
ing human factors, using phishing, social engineering and
human frailty attacks. This inspired us to focus on designing
a usable device that can boost the users ability to recognize
abnormal transactions.
Accordingly, we conducted two experiments for validating
the usability of the proposed solution. The 1st experiment
was a controlled one with only a few participants, whilst the
2nd experiment was uncontrolled but with a large number
of participants. Both experiments showed that the addition
of speech improved the users recognition of manipulated
banking transactions. However, both experiments suffered
from weaknesses and neither showed the improvement we
expected. Consequently, we recommend performing a large
scale experiment in a controlled environment to validating
the effectiveness of our approach based on different scenar-
ios.
We conclude that designing a cost effective, secure, user
friendly transaction authentication device is a very difficult
task. We think that German banks have made a good choice
in opting for the existing Sm@rt TAN-plus device. Whilst
this is not the most user friendly of devices, nevertheless
it is cheap to produce and it effectively aborts modified
transactions. One downside is that it also aborts transactions
in which the user has made a mistake e.g. by mistyping the
transaction number into the device or the TAN into the PC,
but this is a failsafe route which does minimum harm to the
user. The speech and vision device that we have designed is
easier to use, should be comparable in price to produce, but
still suffers from the problem that users do not always spot
subtly modified transactions, and this could lead to their
bank accounts either being fraudulently debited or money
going mistakenly to the wrong recipient.
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